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Online Free Speech or Materially Supporting Terrorism?
Dorlin A. Armijo*
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging conflict between respecting a citizen's constitutional right
to free speech and penalizing involvement with Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
tions (FTO) is underlined in the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
United States v. Mehanna.' The First Circuit erred in affirming the lower
court's verdict because the court failed to address the constitutional issue at
hand. Mehanna should have answered a crucial question: do the "material
support" statutes criminalize a citizen's association and advocacy of terrorist
organizations? Unfortunately, the First Circuit never addressed that question,
instead holding that Tarek Mehanna's conviction, for supporting terrorism
and fraud, was appropriate because there was no legal error.2 This case note
seeks to answer the question unheeded by the First Circuit and to critique the
court's holding. The material support statutes,3 as applied to Mehanna's case,
criminalize a constitutionally protected right to association and freedom of
speech.4 In its assessment of the material support statutes, the First Circuit
too quickly dismissed protected online free speech. As a result, the First Cir-
cuit created a dangerous precedent for the unchartered territory of cyber ac-
tivity and criminal law. Because of its failure to address the issue of free
speech and its creation of hazardous precedent, the First Circuit should have
reversed the trial court's judgment.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTES
Even before the threat of terrorism permeated through the walls of Con-
gress, a similar threat was present. In the early 1950's, Congress aggressively
aimed to prevent citizen involvement with any communist ideology or re-
gime that they believed posed a threat to American ideals.5 As a result, Con-
gress passed the Smith Act, which prohibited a citizen's membership in any
group that sought to overthrow or destroy the U.S. government.6 The Smith
* Dorlin A. Armijo is a 2016 candidate for a Doctorate of Jurisprudence from
Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
1. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 46-49.
3. Material Support Statutes punish individuals who provide material support to
terroristic groups. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
4. Id. at 48.
5. In 1954, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy drew public attention to a communist
infiltration within the United States in his infamous speech accusing several
federal officials of being Communists and perpetuating a communist ideology.
See generally U.S. Senate, Have You No Sense of Decency?, SENATE.Gov,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Haveyouno_senseof
decency.htm (last visited July 26, 2015).
6. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994).
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Act's criminalization of certain types of membership was quickly challenged
in United States v. Scales, where the Supreme Court upheld the statute as
constitutional.7 The Supreme Court reasoned that the statute sufficiently en-
sured that no "legitimate political expression or association would be im-
paired."8 The statute was upheld because of its scienter language, "knowing
the purposes of," in conjunction with the requirement that the citizen pro-
mote the group's "illegal aims."9 With the emergence of terrorist activities in
the early 1980's that continued into the 1990's, Congress adopted a similar
statute that imposed stronger penalties on crimes related to terrorism. Finally,
in 1996 Congress added section 2339B to the existing PATRIOT Act to ad-
dress the issue of terrorism.o Section 2339B prohibits "knowingly
provid[ing] material support or resources to a terrorist organization, or at-
tempt[ing] or conspir[ing] to do so."I Consistent with the scienter require-
ment examined in Scales, section 2339B attempts to curb any
unconstitutional limitations on free speech and association by including an
intent requirement, "knowingly."12
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Tarek Mehanna on seven charges.
Mehanna was indicted for three counts of fraud based upon false statements
made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the course of a
2006 investigation.13 Specifically related to the right of free speech, the
Mehanna was charged with four charges related to terrorism: (1) conspiracy
to provide material support to al-Qa'ida in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B;I4
(2) conspiracy to provide material support to kill persons in a foreign country
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A;15 (3) providing or attempting to provide
material support for a conspiracy to kill persons in a foreign country in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A;16 and (4) conspiracy to kill persons in a foreign
7. See generally Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
8. Id. at 229.
9. Id.
10. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
12. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012) (criminalizing membership with organiza-
tions that seek to overthrow the U.S. government) with 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
(criminalizing material support to FTOs).
13. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013).
14. See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 1, Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (No.
13-1125), 2014 WL 3724966, at *1.
15. See id. at *1-2.
16. See id. at *2; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A (2012).
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country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956.17 The four terrorism charges were
based on two alternative theories provided by the government. 18 The first
theory was based on Mehanna's travel to Yemen in 2004 and the other theory
was based on his online translations of Islamic texts in 2005.19
The prosecution primarily based their case on evidence that Mehanna
traveled to Yemen in "search of a terrorist training camp."20 Meanwhile,
Mehanna offered evidence that his trip to Yemen was to "pursue Islamic
studies."21 The prosecution's alternative theory for Mehanna's terrorism
charges was based on translations of Arabic materials into English posted on
a website, at-Tibyan, "that comprised an online community for those sympa-
thetic to al-Qa'ida and Salafi-Jihad perspectives."22 Mehanna defended his
online translations by arguing that this cyber activity was a form of political
and religious participation protected by the First Amendment.23
IV. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
After thirty-five days of trial, Mehanna motioned for a directed verdict,
but the court denied the motion.24 A jury issued a general verdict and con-
victed Mehanna on all counts. 25 In 2012, Mehanna was sentenced to 210
months imprisonment.26 Mehanna subsequently appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the district court's judgment in
2013.27
V. FIRST CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The First Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis of Mehanna's
charges by discussing the scienter requirements provided in the material sup-
port statutes.28 Mehanna argued that the scienter requirements of both mate-
rial support statutes clearly mandated that the accused know their support
17. See Brief for United States in Opposition, supra note 14, at 2; see also 18
U.S.C.A. § 956 (2012).
18. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 41.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 43.
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id. at 44.
24. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (No. 13-1125), 2014
WL 1090039, at *4.
25. See id. at *4-5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 42.
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was meant to further terrorist acts. 29 Rejecting Mehanna's interpretation of
the statutes, the First Circuit looked to the plain language of section 2339B
and determined that the "knowingly" requirement was two-fold.30 First, as
determined by Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the defendant must in-
tend to commit the act that constituted "support".31 And second, the defen-
dant must be aware of the organization's particular classification as a FTO.32
The First Circuit concluded that Mehanna acted both intentionally-by trav-
eling to Yemen and by posting online translations-and acted with knowl-
edge of al'Qa'ida's classification as a FTO.33 Therefore, the court concluded
that the jury's conviction under section 2339B was sufficiently supported by
evidence presented at trial.
The First Circuit further justified their reasoning by contrasting and
comparing section 2339B with section 2339A. Unlike the intent requirement
of section 2339A, section 2339B merely prohibits "knowingly provid[ing]
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization."34 However,
the scienter requirement in 2339A is a more stringent scienter requirement
than section 2339B.35 Section 2339A requires that the person know that their
support was done in order to further terrorist activities.36 Evaluating the evi-
dence admitted at trial, the First Circuit held that the jury was entitled to
draw inferences and convict based on section 2339A.37 But, the court de-
clined to determine the specific activity that supported the jury's conviction
under section 2339A.38 Instead, the court found that the defendant's trip to
Yemen in search of a terrorist camp and his online translations were gener-
ally sufficient to support the conviction.39 The First Circuit further noted that
an attempt to specify which conduct reasonably upheld the jury's conviction
would be improper because the court would be acting as a magical "sorting
hat," attempting to divine into the minds of jurors.40 Instead, the court stated




32. Id. (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010)).
33. See id. at 42-43.
34. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 42.
35. Id. at 43.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 44-46.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 47-48.
41. Id.
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States,4 2 the First Circuit explained that "a verdict must be upheld as long as
the evidence is adequate to support one of the government's alternative theo-
ries of guilt,"43 thereby completely overlooking Mehanna's First Amendment
protection argument.44 Therefore, Mehanna's convictions under section
2339A were upheld.45
Finally, the First Circuit Court of Appeals argued that even if Griffin did
not preclude addressing First Amendment concerns, the conviction should be
upheld.46 The court reasoned that the trial court's jury instructions suffi-
ciently prevented a guilty verdict based on protected free speech or associa-
tion.47 The district court jury instructions stated:
You need not worry about the scope or effect of the guarantee of
free speech contained in the First Amendment to our Constitution.
According to the Supreme Court, this statute already accommo-
dates that guarantee by punishing only conduct that is done in co-
ordination with or at the direction of a foreign terrorist
organization. Advocacy that is done independently of the terrorist
organization and not at its direction or in coordination with it does
not violate the statute.4 8
The First Circuit noted that the jury's instructions were consistent with the
material support statutes because the statutes' language provides that "indi-
viduals who act entirely independent of the [FTO] to advance its goals or
objectives shall not be considered to be working under the [FTO]'s direction
and control."49 The court concluded that the language of the statute, coupled
with the instructions provided to the jury, acted as sufficient limitations on
the jury's determination.50 The jury's verdict could not be based on "indepen-
dent" speech or association, but could only punish conduct that is made in
"coordination" with FTOs.51 Having addressed the sufficiency of evidence
used to support Mehanna's convictions, the First Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court and upheld Mehanna's terrorism-related convic-
tions. The district court, however, only grazed the surface of Mehanna's
constitutional concerns. In 2014, Mehanna petitioned for a writ of certiorari
42. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991).
43. Id.
44. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 48.
45. Id. at 46-49.
46. Id. at 48.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 49 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2009)).
50. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 49.
51. Id.
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to the U.S. Supreme Court and, on October 6th of the same year, the Court
declined review.52
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. Convictions based on 2339B
Convictions based on Mehanna's online activity were erroneous be-
cause his online conduct is constitutionally protected speech as provided by
the First Amendment. The court's use of section 2339B violates Mehanna's
right to free speech by equating his translations of Arabic materials with
"services" that trigger the statute's application.53 The First Amendment pro-
tects a person's expression of speech so long as the speech does not produce
"imminent lawless action."54 The Supreme Court explained in Brandenburg
that "the mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral neces-
sity for a resort to force and violence" does not rise to the level of inciting
imminent disorder.55 Applied to Mehanna's case, his translations of religious
scriptures, posted on a website, did not rise to the level of inciting imminent
disorder. Mehanna's translations do not incite imminent disorder because the
content of the translated materials themselves do not promote violence.
Although the majority of free speech cases have not addressed protec-
tions of online speech, the change in the forum for speech does not alter the
rights held by a U.S. citizen. In fact, the Court has held that-even when
addressing cyber activity in the context of websites that depict sexually ex-
plicit materials of minors-the Constitution's protection of speech prevents
the establishment of laws that severely limit a person's right to free speech.56
For example, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court struck down a
statute that imposed harsh penalties for the depiction of child pornography
because the statute was considered overly broad.57 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that overly broad statutes threatening harsh criminal punishments im-
permissibly "chill" a person's legitimate and constitutional exercise of free
speech.58
52. See Supreme Court of the United States, 2014 JOURNAL 12, SUPREMECOURT
.Gov, Oct. 6, 2014, No. 13-1125, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/journal/jnl]4.pdf.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2012) (defining "material support" to include
"services").
54. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
55. Id. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)) (internal
citations omitted).
56. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 243 (2002); see also Reno v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 864-68 (1997).
57. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
58. See id. at 244.
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The child pornography cases, regarding cyber-crimes, are directly rele-
vant to the case at hand. Just like the child pornography statute that harshly
penalized online conduct, section 2339B is also overly broad because it
harshly penalizes legitimate expressions of free speech online.59 The record
presented no evidence to show that Mehanna's translations displayed com-
plicity in a conspiracy to instigate a tangible, imminent terrorist act. There-
fore, Mehanna's online translations are within the purview of protected
speech.
Additionally, even if Mehanna's conduct was not protected, the statute
is overly broad. The statute impermissibly allows for the potential criminal-
ization of any online participation in a religious or political discourse relating
to terrorist organizations. The First Circuit failed to provide a clear line. The
Constitution requires a bright line distinguishing when online conduct relat-
ing to terrorist organizations is protected political discourse and when such
conduct rises to the level of criminality.
Furthermore, little speech or association would ever be protected if the
scienter requirement of 2339B, "knowingly," simply requires that a person is
aware of the FTO's classification. Congress enacted 2339B, by preventing
any sort of communication or association with any terrorist organization, to
essentially punish membership within a FTO.60 The government fears that
such membership will lead to a citizen's participation in a FTO's terrorist
attack. But the government's interest in preventing membership within a
FTO must be narrowly applied to the precise conduct the government seeks
to prohibit.61 In fact, the Supreme Court in Elfbrant v. Russell stated that
statutes prohibiting certain types of membership must include a specific in-
tent requirement to narrow the statute's application.62 El/brant suggests that
the statutes could only criminalize membership when a person joins the or-
ganization with the intent to further the illegal aims of the organization.63 In
Mehanna, the First Circuit did the opposite, requiring only an intent to com-
mit the act, and a knowledge of the organization's classification as an FTO.64
Thus, section 2339B unconstitutionally inhibits a citizen's right to associa-
tion and should have been rejected.
The Supreme Court's decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
is not dispositive in this case. In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court up-
held section 2339B against a non-profit organization that sought to provide
59. Punishment for a conviction under either sections 2339A or 2339B carries a
maximum of fifteen years imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
61. See Elfbrant v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966) (holding that statutes limiting a
person's right to association must be narrowly drawn to define and punish the
precise conduct that the State has a special interest in prohibiting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 19.
64. See id. at 42-43.
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humanitarian assistance to terrorist organizations.65 In that case, members of
a non-profit sought an injunction to prevent applying the material support
statute66 to their work with recognized FTOs.67 The non-profit argued that the
statute prevented the organization from providing advice on peaceful dispute
resolution strategies between the United Nations to Kurdistand Worker's
Party in Turkey and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.68 The
Court held that the Brandenberg test6 9 was met and therefore the material
support statute passed constitutional muster according to the specific facts of
the case.70 However, Humanitarian Law Project is distinguishable from
Mehanna because Mehanna's actions were not directly impacting the organi-
zation itself.71 Rather, his online translations were posted on a general Jihad-
perspective website that had no direct link to the organization.72 Additionally,
the Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project narrowly applied its hold-
ing to the circumstances of the organization's case.73 In fact, the Court
clearly stated that it did not "address the more difficult cases that arise under
the statute in the future."74 The Supreme Court, as manifested by its holding,
imagined a more challenging case where the clear line between protected
speech and association is blurred. Without a clear line, the material support
statute may be construed against the type of direct support that Congress
sought to inhibit.
B. Convictions based on 2339A
The First Circuit Court of Appeals erred by ignoring the constitutional
issue at hand. The court alternatively argued that, as a reviewing court, their
only role was to determine if there was legal error.75 The court incorrectly
relied on Griffin to uphold Mehanna's conviction. The First Circuit reasoned
that the trial court's conclusion was proper as long as any of the two altema-
65. See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
67. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8-10.
68. Id.
69. The government cannot punish speech unless that speech is directed towards
inciting, and is likely to incite, imminent lawless action. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
70. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39-40.
71. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32
(1st Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1125), 2014 WL 1090039, at *24.
72. See id.
73. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8.
74. Id.
75. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 46-49.
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tive theories of guilt could reasonably lead to the verdict.76 But, Griffin ex-
pressly rejected the court's precise reasoning, holding that "where a
provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the
constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict that may have rested
on that ground."77
The First Circuit wrongfully upheld Mehanna's general verdict because
any reliance or blame assigned to Mehanna's translations of Arabic materials
were examples of protected speech, thus rendering his conduct constitution-
ally protected. The general verdict insinuates that the jury assigned blame to
Mehanna's constitutionally protected expressions of speech. The reviewing
court's job, therefore, is to ascertain whether actual First Amendment viola-
tions occurred when Mehanna was convicted on all terrorism counts through
a general verdict. This job did not require any guess-work or "divining" as
the First Circuit colorfully explained; instead, as a reviewing court, the First
Circuit had an obligation to uphold constitutional rights violated at trial.78
In contrast to the First Circuit's holding, section 2339A contains a pre-
cise scienter requirement that is only met when a person provides support
with the intention of furthering terrorist activity. The strict scienter require-
ment present in 2339A, not only distinguishes the statute from 2339B, but
more importantly, avoids the chilling effect its sister statute has on First
Amendment protections. Additionally, the stronger scienter requirement in
section 2339A safeguards against the potential abuses presented in section
2339B. As illustrated by Mehanna's case, Mehanna's online translations ser-
vices do not meet the requirement of 2339A, but did meet the vague, over-
reaching requirements of 2339B.79
VII. MEHANNA'S IMPACT ON ONLINE FREE SPEECH
The First Circuit's decision in Mehanna is especially problematic in the
context of cyber speech. The problem arose because the court failed to adju-
dicate which of Mehanna's behaviors triggered the federal material support
statute-his trip to Yemen or his online translations. As a result, the court
impliedly permitted a criminal conviction based only on a person's online
activity. Worse yet, Mehanna's case uniquely punished his independent
thoughts on terrorism when the district court relied on his translations posted
on an online forum. Mehanna invites an exhausting line-drawing exercise.
How much does the law tolerate sympathizing with al-Qa'ida in a forum
designed to facilitate that exact discussion? What about online bloggers who
devote their entire website to discussing and explaining the same Muslim
practices and texts that Mehanna translated? How much pro-al-Qa'ida speech
76. Id. at 48.
77. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 53 (1991).
78. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
79. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 42-43 (the First Circuit upheld Mehanna's convic-
tion under § 2339B).
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renders the case legally significant? Back-dropped against recent news of an
online blogger receiving 1,000 floggings in Saudi Arabia for this exact type
of online posting,80 the Supreme Court may have to adjudicate the dangerous
line drawing that Mehanna muddled.81
VIII. SUMMARY
The First Circuit Court of Appeals failed to address the constitutional
concerns presented by Mehanna's conviction. The First Circuit impermissi-
bly upheld Mehanna's convictions under section 2339B because his online
translations do not rise to the level of inciting imminent acts of terrorism.
The court, therefore, failed to prove, and could not prove, that Mehanna's
actions met the Brandenberg test provided by the Supreme Court. Even if the
First Circuit did not agree that Mehanna's translations were protected speech,
the court's blatant refusal to address the issue itself is problematic. Addition-
ally, the jury's general verdict against Mehanna was unconstitutional because
Mehanna's cyber activities fell within the scope of protected free speech and
right of association. As such, the enforcement of the material support stat-
utes, specifically section 2339A as applied to Mehanna's online translations,
violated his First Amendment rights. Thus, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the lower court's ruling because of its unconstitutional
application of 2339B and its erroneous application of Griffin in 2339A. Fi-
nally, Mehanna creates a dangerous precedent against online participants that
seek to encourage discourse. Mehanna chills discourse not only within the
context of terrorism, but also with regard to religious principles and prac-
tices. Perhaps the Supreme Court will soon decide to settle the waters with
respect to online protected free speech; in the meantime, Mehanna's rippling
effect persists.
80. Michael Pearson, Saudi Arabian Rights Activist Reportedly Flogged Despite
International Outcry, CNN (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/01/12/middleeast/saudi-arabia-activist-flogging/.
81. Although the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to clarify free speech pro-
tections relating to online speech, it has chosen not to, leaving this question
unheeded. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015) (the Su-
preme Court declined to be the first appellate court to address the issue).
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